G: Specifics of Attacks Directed at Aircraft in the Air

[Commentary]


  1. Aircraft in the air are given a special treatment in this Manual for two reasons. The first reason is their greater vulnerability when they are airborne, since a successful attack has a high likelihood of killing every person onboard, in particular passengers who will normally have no possibility to escape. The second reason is that the speed of modern aircraft is likely to require rapid decision-making relating to identification of their nature as a lawful target that can be attacked in compliance with the law of international armed conflict. These two elements make it necessary to establish, in air and missile warfare, proper procedures designed to implement the law of international armed conflict. In other words, it is not the law that is different, but rather how it plays out in these situations.
  2. With regard to references to ICAO Rules such as the ICAO Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft,[311] it ought to be borne in mind that these have not been designed for wartime. The ICAO provisions are not a part of the law of international armed conflict proper, but ought to be regarded as valuable guidelines to be adhered to as far as military considerations permit.
  3. The requirement to take all feasible precautions to verify that an aircraft to be attacked is a military objective (see Rule 32 (a) and Rule 35 (a) and, in this subsection, see Rule 40), also applies when a UAV is the intended target of an attack. There is a complementary requirement for Belligerent Parties and Neutrals operating civilian UAVs to take all practicable measures to clearly indicate their civilian status.
  4. Some members of the Group of Experts believed that consideration must also be given to the possibility that aircraft that are shot down in the air may cause collateral damage on the ground (see Rule 14; see also the paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Rule 68 (d)). The majority of the Group of Experts rejected this assertion, based upon the general impracticality of factoring in such eventual collateral damage during an air-to-air engagement. However, the majority of the Group of Experts conceded that there may be exceptional circumstances in some rare instances of air supremacy. In these circumstances, when a military aircraft intends to shoot down an aircraft — other than an armed military aircraft — over densely populated areas, the attack ought to be delayed in order to avoid — or, in any event, to minimize — collateral damage.
  1. Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft, Consolidation of Current ICAO Provisions and Special Recommendations, 1990, ICAO, Doc 9433—AN/926.

Rule 40

Before an aircraft is attacked in the air, all feasible precautions must be taken to verify that it constitutes a military objective. Verification ought to use the best means available under the prevailing circumstances, having regard to the immediacy of any potential threat. Factors relevant to verification may include:

[Commentary]

(a) Visual identification.

[Commentary]

(b) Responses to oral warnings over radio.

[Commentary]

(c) Infra-red signature.

[Commentary]

(d) Radar signature.

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(e) Electronic signature.

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(f) Identification modes and codes.

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(g) Number and formation of aircraft.

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(h) Altitude, speed, track, profile and other flight characteristics.

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(i) Pre-flight and in-flight air traffic control information regarding possible flights.

[Commentary]

  1. The feasibility of taking precautions often depends on the degree of threat presented by an unidentified aircraft, or by other factors. A potential threat can be more or less immediate. A potentially hostile aircraft that is approaching rapidly represents a greater threat than one traveling in another direction. Considerations of force protection suggest that greater precautions ought to be taken to verify that the aircraft constitutes a military objective when more time is reasonably available before a decision to engage it.
  2. An attacker must bear in mind that verification can be complicated by camouflage, stealth or deception designed to conceal the presence or military status of an enemy aircraft. Certain forms of deception would, however, amount to unlawful perfidy, see Section Q.
  3. Rule 40 applies to any type of aircraft, provided that it constitutes a military objective. As to civilian airliners, they are entitled to particular care in terms of precautions, see Section J (I) and J (III).
  4. The factors listed are provided by way of illustration, and their specific relevance depends on the factual background. There may be other factors relevant to verification, such as information based upon intelligence gathering. As well, it ought to be borne in mind that medical aircraft have specific means of identification, such as a flashing blue light and radio message (see Commentary on Rule 76 (b)).

Visual identification means that an aircraft is identified as a military objective by the use of eyesight, including the use of binoculars or similar sight-enhancing devices. This is typically achieved through interception of the aircraft (see the chapeau of the Commentary on Section U).

An unidentified aircraft ought to be raised on radio and asked to identify itself and state its intentions. The “response” can be either explicit or implicit, in which case it may be demonstrated by conduct such as change of course or any other manoeuvres. The response, or absence thereof, may strengthen or weaken conclusions as to the aircraft’s nature.

Infra-red signature means the appearance of the aircraft to infra-red sensors. It depends on several factors, including the temperature of the aircraft and the waveband of the detecting sensor.

Radar signature means (i) the detailed waveform of a radar echo from the aircraft; and (ii) the detailed characteristics of a radar transmission, i.e. an indication of what kind of radar the aircraft is using. The radar echo can give indications about the size, shape and movements of an aircraft, including moving parts such as the rotor of a helicopter.

Electronic signature means the detailed characteristics of the electronic emissions from the aircraft, which may reveal, e.g., the type of radio communication equipment used by the aircraft. The second definition of radar signature, as set forth in Rule 40 (d), may also be regarded as a form of electronic signature.

Identification modes and codes refer to systems whereby an aircraft that is detected on radar is interrogated by an electronic signal (also called secondary surveillance radar (SSR)) and gives an automatic response by using a transponder. The response ought to be used to identify the aircraft to both an intercepting aircraft and to airspace managers, whether military or civilian. Civilian systems are designed to assist the manage-ment of air traffic, while the purpose of military systems (also called Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF)) is to avoid the direction of attacks against friendly forces (“blue-on-blue”) or civilian aircraft. The fact that an aircraft identifies itself as either a friendly military aircraft or as a civilian aircraft is not necessarily conclusive evidence of its character.

Civilian aircraft will usually fly alone, while military aircraft may fly in formation depending on their mission. However, civilian aircraft are sometimes “escorted” by military aircraft in which case they may become a military objective (see paragraph 3 of the Commentary on Rule 27 (d)).

  1. Military aircraft on attack missions can make manoeuvres that civilian aircraft are not likely to do, such as approaching the target at low altitude in order to avoid or postpone detection by radar and thereafter making a sharp climb before launching weapons that require a minimum altitude.
  2. A steady course by an aircraft originating from one exclusively civilian airport and heading towards another, may suggest that it is a civilian aircraft.

  1. In some areas, civilian air traffic (including civilian airliners) may be frequent, whereas in other areas such traffic may be light. These factors must be taken into account when determining the nature of an aircraft.
  2. Information received from air traffic control services as to whether scheduled or non-scheduled flights can be expected around a particular location at a particular time ought to be taken into account, although the possibility that an aircraft is off schedule or off course ought to be considered.

Rule 41

Belligerent Parties and Neutrals providing air traffic control service ought to establish procedures whereby military commanders – including commanders of military aircraft – are informed on a continuous basis of designated routes assigned to, and flight plans filed by, civilian aircraft in the area of hostilities (including information on communication channels, identification modes and codes, destination, passengers and cargo).

[Commentary]

  1. This Rule is based on Para. 74 of the SRM/ACS.[312]
  2. Rule 41 deals with general precautions whose purpose is to promote a clearer understanding of the situation in the air in a general sense, so that confusion and the likelihood of mistakes can be minimized. The feasible precautions mentioned in Rule 40 are specifically directed at clarifying the status of a particular flight.
  3. The extent to which Rule 41 can be applied in practice depends on the circumstances, especially the degree of air control exercised over the relevant airspace.
  4. States providing air traffic control services in their region bear a special responsibility for the safety of civilian air traffic.
  5. Neutrals providing air traffic control service ought to cooperate in establishing the necessary procedures, in the interest of the safety of civilian air traffic. However, under the law of neutrality, Neutrals must not appear to support military operations by Belligerent Parties (see Section X).
  6. If air traffic control services are operated by a private firm, all concerned parties ought to cooperate with the firm, as far as military requirements permit, in the interest of the safety of civilian aviation.
  7. In non-international armed conflicts, there is no such thing as neutrality in the legal sense, and Rule 41 is therefore not applicable. However, (i) the central government providing air traffic control services ought to behave in accordance with Rule 41; and (ii) when a foreign State conducts air traffic control services in an area subject to a non-international armed conflict, it ought to make its best efforts to contribute to the safety of civilian aviation in that area.
  8. In non-international armed conflicts, a national air traffic control service can hardly be expected to open channels of communication “on a continuous basis” with the commanders of non-State organized armed groups. All bodies providing air traffic control services, however, ought to do everything feasible to ensure that military commanders — including commanders of military aircraft — are made aware (to the maximum extent possible) of designated routes assigned to, or flight plans filed by, civilian aircraft in the area of military operations (including information on communication channels, identification modes and codes, destination, passengers and cargo).
  1. Para. 74 of SRM/ACS: “Belligerents and neutral States concerned, and authorities providing air traffic services, should establish procedures whereby commanders of warships and military aircraft are aware on a continuous basis of designated routes assigned to or flight plans filed by civil aircraft in the area of military operations, including information on communication channels, identification modes and codes, destination, passengers and cargo.”