E: General Rules

Rule 22

In the definition of objects as military objectives (see Rule 1 (y)), the following criteria apply:

[Commentary]

(a) The “nature” of an object symbolizes its fundamental character. Examples of military objectives by nature include military aircraft (including military UAV/UCAVs); military vehicles (other than medical transport); missiles and other weapons; military equipment; military fortifications, facilities and depots; warships; ministries of defence and armaments factories.

[Commentary]

(b) Application of the “location” criterion can result in specific areas of land such as a mountain pass, a bridgehead or jungle trail becoming military objectives.

[Commentary]

(c) The “purpose” of an object although not military by nature − is concerned with the intended future use of an object.

[Commentary]

(d)  The “use” of an object relates to its present function, with the result that a civilian object can become a military objective due to its use by armed forces.

[Commentary]

  1. Subject to the other requirements of the definition (see paragraph 3 of the Commentary on the chapeau to this Rule), there are four alternative criteria qualifying an object as a military objective: nature, location, purpose or use. These four criteria are the core of the definition of military objective, and they are analyzed in some detail in the four subparagraphs of this Rule.
  2. As a practical matter, attacks are most commonly based on an object’s nature (generally the enemy’s military equipment or installations) or by use by the enemy; qualification by purpose (the enemy’s intended future use of an object) or location is less common.
  3. The definition of military objective not only requires that an object “make[s] an effective contribution to military action” “by nature, location, purpose or use”, but also that its “total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage” (see Rule 1 (y)). As indicated in paragraph 3 of the commentary to Rule 1 (y), compliance with the first criterion will generally result in the advantage required of the second.

  1. In order to qualify as a military objective by nature, the object in question must have an inherent characteristic or attribute which contributes to military action. Military equipment and facilities most clearly qualify on this basis, as do tanks, military aircraft, military airfields, or military barracks. Even when not in use, such objects always constitute lawful targets during armed conflict.
  2. As mentioned in Rule 22 (a), military objectives by nature include Ministries of Defence. This will be the case even if such Ministries are staffed in part by civilians. Of course, to the extent that a Ministry of Defence has physically separate non-defence departments, as in the case of the Swiss Federal Ministry of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, its facilities devoted exclusively to such civilian functions are not military objectives by nature.
  3. The examples mentioned in Rule 22 (a) are non-exhaustive. Their distinctive feature is that they qualify as military objectives by nature in all circumstances. Other objects could qualify as military objectives by nature as well (see Rule 23).

“Location” relates to selected areas that have special importance to military operations, such as a particular mountain pass that may offer enemy armed forces a route of retreat in the face of a planned attack. Because of the location of the pass, it is lawful to block it through air attack, irrespective of use. Similarly, an attacker may wish to blind the enemy by depriving it of high ground from which it could observe the attacker’s operation. It may also destroy natural cover in the area, to prohibit the enemy from using it as an observation point. In these cases, it is not actual “use” or the enemy’s intended future use (“purpose”) that matters. The governing criterion is the need to attack a location so as to enhance or safeguard the attacker’s operations or to diminish the enemy’s options.

  1. It is essential to distinguish “purpose” from “use” (see Rule 22 (d)). The latter refers to present function of an object, whereas the former focuses on intended future use. The purpose criterion recognizes that an attacker need not wait until an object is actually used for military ends before being allowed to attack it as a military objective.
  2. The key issue in determining purpose is the enemy’s intent. In many cases, the enemy’s intent as to the future use of an object is clear. An example of such clarity is when reliable intelligence or other information indicates that an apartment building is being renovated with a view to serving as a military barracks. The apartment building becomes a military objective by purpose, regardless of its actual or ultimate use.
  3. Often, however, the enemy’s intent is not clear. In such circumstances, it is necessary to avoid sheer speculation and to rely on hard evidence, based perhaps on intelligence gathering. The dilemma is that intelligence is of varying degrees of reliability. The attacker must always act reasonably, i.e. as would be proper under a similar set of circumstances for any other Belligerent Party. In other words, the attacker must ask itself whether it would be reasonable to conclude that the intelligence was reliable enough to conduct the attack in light of the circumstances ruling at the time.
  4. The enemy’s intent may be based on specified preconditions prior to actual implementation of any existing plans. In such circumstances, these specified preconditions have to be fulfilled before the civilian object becomes a military objective by purpose. In other words, intelligence or other information has to lead to a reasonable conclusion that plans are in the process of being implemented, or will be implemented in the near future. Two examples can be given: (i) Communication intercepts or other intelligence may reveal that certain civilian airfields have been designated as alternative recovery airfields in the event that a military airfield is unusable. Once the military airfield is unusable, the designated alternative recovery airfields become military objectives by purpose and may be attacked, regardless of their actual or ultimate use; (ii) Overt contingency plans may exist for the use of certain civilian objects (such as civilian transports) for military airlift purposes. As long as no action is taken to activate the civilian transports for these purposes, they remain civilian objects. However, upon activation for military service, the transports in question become military objectives by purpose, regardless of their actual or ultimate use.

  1. This criterion requires actual use by the enemy of a particular object that, on the face of it, is civilian in nature. In other words, the object is not a military objective by nature, but subsequently becomes a lawful target as a result of conversion to military use.
  2. For instance, a purely civilian airfield that is subsequently used to launch or recover military aircraft loses its civilian character and becomes a military objective for the duration of its military use. Other examples would relate to (i) enemy troops billeted in a civilian hotel or school; (ii) enemy use of a civilian broadcast facility for military transmission; or (iii) civilian vehicles being commandeered by enemy forces to transport troops or materiel.
  3. In all such instances, the civilian objects become military objectives through use and may be attacked, subject to the principle of proportionality (see Rule 14) and Section G. They may not be attacked prior to such use unless there is sufficient evidence of the enemy’s intent to use the object for military ends (thereby qualifying under the purpose criterion, see Rule 22 (c)).
  4. Once use for a military purpose ceases, the object ceases to be a lawful target and may no longer be attacked. That said, if there is reliable intelligence that the enemy intends to use the object again in the future, it may remain a military objective, albeit by purpose, rather than by use. However, the mere fact that an object was used once as a military objective does not suffice, in and of itself, to establish purpose for future use.
  5. Any civilian object may become a military objective through use, including those entitled to specific protection but abused by a Belligerent Party through military use (see Sections K-N). Even objects entitled to specific protection, such as medical units (see Section K) or cultural property (see Section N (II)) can become military objectives if so used. In such a case, see Rule 32 (a) as well as Rule 35 (a) and Rule 35 (b).
  6. In case of doubt as to whether an object which is ordinarily dedicated to civilian purposes is being used for military purposes, it may only be attacked if, based on all the information reasonably available to the commander at the time, there are reasonable grounds to believe that it has become and remains a military objective (see Rule 12 (b)).
  7. Any military use of a civilian object renders it a military objective. However, the fact that it has become a military objective by use does not exclude the possibility of simultaneous civilian use. Such objects are commonly referred to as “dual-use” objects. Despite the fact that they have become a military objective, the decision whether or not they can be attacked depends by and large on the application of the principle of proportionality (see Rule 14). The classic example in the context of air or missile operations is an airport used both by military and civilian aircraft.
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Rule 23

Objects which may qualify as military objectives through the definition in Rules 1 (y) and 22 (a) include, but are not limited to, factories, lines and means of communications (such as airfields, railway lines, roads, bridges and tunnels); energy producing facilities; oil storage depots; transmission facilities and equipment.

[Commentary]

  1. The Group of Experts hesitated whether this additional list of military objectives by nature is required in light of the already existing Rule 22 (a). There were three views in the Group of Experts. One view was that all objects listed here belong in Rule 22 (a) because they are military objectives by nature at all times. The opposite view was that the objects listed in Rule 23 are not necessarily military objectives by nature, but, if at all, by use, purpose or location.[261] The majority of the Group of Experts accepted the present Rule as a compromise third view, by which military objectives by nature were to be divided into two subsets. The first, reflected in Rule 22 (a), consists of military objectives by nature at all times. By contrast, the second subset — reflected in Rule 23 — consists of objects which become military objectives by nature only in light of the circumstances ruling at the time.
  2. The reference to Rule 1 (y) in its totality is designed to stress the fact that the objects listed by way of example may not be attacked unless the criteria of Rule 1 (y) are met. However, it must be borne in mind that the list is given in the context of military objectives by nature. The focus, therefore, is on the cross-reference to Rule 22 (a). That is to say, the present Rule does not refer to Rule 22 (b) − (d). The objects listed in Rule 23, while subject to debate and some disagreement, reflect the views of the majority of the Group of Experts.
  1. According to the ICRC, there are no subsets of military objectives by nature. In its view, it has no foundation in the existing law of international armed conflict. The Commentary to Rule 22 (a) clearly indicates that an object is a military objective by nature only if it has an “inherent characteristic or attribute which contributes to military action”. An “inherent characteristic or attribute” cannot be conceived of on a merely temporary basis. By definition it has to be permanent. In the opinion of the ICRC, Rule 23 — for illustration purposes — includes categories of objects which, depending on the circumstances, may qualify as military objectives through use, purpose or location. In other words, every object falling into the categories mentioned in Rule 22 (a) is a military objective by nature, whereas the objects falling into the categories cited in Rule 23 may only under certain circumstances qualify as military objectives. For example, a factory producing weapons (see Rule 24 (a)), is a military objective by nature. A factory producing purely civilian goods is not a military objective. However, depending on use or purpose it may become a military objective. The key is that the test for military objectives set forth in Rule 1 (y) must be met before an object may be attacked.
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Rule 24

The connection between a military objective and military action may be direct or indirect.

[Commentary]

  1. As set forth in Rule 1 (y), the definition of military objectives depends in part on their making “an effective contribution to military action”. This Rule stresses that the connection between the target and ongoing military operations need not be direct. For instance, it is lawful to attack enemy military storage depots or barracks far from the battlefield because such assets constitute reserves for further military action by the enemy. It is also well-accepted that factories producing munitions and military equipment are lawful targets (see Rule 22 (a)). So too would be a port, railroad, road or airport used in the transport of supplies necessary for the production by the factory of military items (see Rule 23).
  2. There is a controversy as to whether “war-sustaining” economic objects qualify as military objectives. A war-sustaining economic object is one which indirectly but effectively supports the enemy’s overall war effort.[262] Those who subscribe to the qualification of such objects as military objectives argue that a Belligerent Party’s war-sustaining capability is directly connected to its combat operations. For instance, they contend that a Belligerent Party may lawfully attack export oil production intended for Neutrals since the profits finance the war effort. Materials of actual military value to the enemy — such as oil or petrol dedicated to military use — are not related to the argument, inasmuch as they constitute military objectives by nature. The crux of the issue is related to revenues from exports of oil which is not put to military use by the enemy. The majority of the Group of Experts took the position that the connection between revenues from such exports and military action is too remote. Consequently, it rejected the war-sustaining argument (see also paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Rule 1 (y)).
  3. The connection between the military objective and “military action” (concept which appears in the definition of military objectives, see Rule 1 (y)) must be actual and discernible, not merely hypothetical or speculative. For instance, the destruction of a civilian airfield incapable of launching military aircraft cannot be justified on the basis that the enemy might one day possess the means of launching and recovering in that airfield. Of course, if the enemy has a clear-cut intent to transform the civilian airfield into one usable for military purposes, the purpose criterion of Rule 22 (c) may turn it into a military objective by purpose.
  4. Further, the action in question must be military in nature and not, for instance, political, financial, economic or social. As an example, striking otherwise civilian targets in order to create the impression that the enemy civilian leadership is weak would not constitute an attack against a military objective which contributes to the enemy’s military action.
  1. Second subparagraph of Para. 8.2.5 of NWP (“Objects”): “Proper objects of attack also include enemy lines of communication, rail yards, bridges, rolling stock, barges, lighters, industrial installations producing war-fighting products, and power generation plants. Economic objects of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability may also be attacked.”
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